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ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE

Rapidly expanding nuclear arsenals in Pakistan
and India portend regional and global catastrophe
Owen B. Toon1*, Charles G. Bardeen2, Alan Robock3, Lili Xia3, Hans Kristensen4,
Matthew McKinzie5, R. J. Peterson6, Cheryl S. Harrison7,8, Nicole S. Lovenduski9, Richard P. Turco10
Pakistan and India may have 400 to 500 nuclear weapons by 2025 with yields from tested 12- to 45-kt values to a
few hundred kilotons. If India uses 100 strategic weapons to attack urban centers and Pakistan uses 150, fatalities
could reach 50 to 125 million people, and nuclear-ignited fires could release 16 to 36 Tg of black carbon in smoke,
depending on yield. The smoke will rise into the upper troposphere, be self-lofted into the stratosphere, and
spread globally within weeks. Surface sunlight will decline by 20 to 35%, cooling the global surface by 2° to 5°C
and reducing precipitation by 15 to 30%, with larger regional impacts. Recovery takes more than 10 years. Net
primary productivity declines 15 to 30% on land and 5 to 15% in oceans threatening mass starvation and additional worldwide collateral fatalities.
INTRODUCTION

The nuclear arsenals of Britain, France, China, Israel, India, and
Pakistan are thought (1–3) to lie in the range of ~100 to 300 warheads each (Fig. 1). Although the use of these weapons by any of
these countries could produce a regional, and likely global, disaster,
India and Pakistan are of special concern because of a long history
of military clashes including serious recent ones, lack of progress in
resolving territorial issues, densely populated urban areas, and ongoing rapid expansion of their respective nuclear arsenals. Here, we
examine the possible repercussions of a nuclear war between India
and Pakistan circa 2025 in which cities are one class of target, either
by direct or collateral targeting. These repercussions have not been
investigated previously. Because of the near-term regional effects of
nuclear blast, thermal radiation, and prompt nuclear radiation, we
find that perhaps for the first time in human history, the fatalities in
a regional war could double the yearly natural global death rate.
Moreover, the environmental stresses related to climate changes caused
by smoke produced from burning cities could lead to widespread
starvation and ecosystem disruption far outside of the war zone itself.
Nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan
The United States and Russia account for around 93% of the world’s
estimated 13,900 nuclear weapons. Seven other nuclear-armed nations
are not bound by treaties that require them to divulge information,
such as the number of strategic launchers and the number of warheads
deployed on missiles, allowing estimates of the numbers of nuclear
warheads and yields in their arsenals, but between them, the seven
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nations may now hold a total of 1200 warheads. As shown in Fig. 1,
India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear forces in 2019 each may contain 140 to
150 warheads, with a possible expansion to 200 to 250 warheads in
each country by 2025 (1, 3–5). Britain (~215), France (~300), China
(~270), and Israel (~80) have a similar number of weapons but have
been maintaining relatively constant arsenals (2). Estimates of the
numbers of warheads possessed by India and Pakistan are based on
the capacity of delivery systems that can be observed from remote
sensing, rather than on the amount of enriched uranium and plutonium fuel that the countries may have produced.
Pakistan has nuclear-capable aircraft (F-16A/B and Mirage III/V) with
ranges up to 2100 km, eight types of land-based ballistic missiles
with possible ranges up to 2750 km, and two types of cruise missiles
with ranges up to 350 km (4, 6). All of India can be reached by the
longest-range delivery systems. Since India has about 400 cities with
more than 100,000 people (7), Pakistan could potentially attack
slightly more than one-third of all moderate- and large-sized cities
in India with its current arsenal and more than two-thirds by 2025.
Kristensen (8) provides satellite images and locations for 10 facilities
in Pakistan that may be locations of missile garrisons or nuclear-
capable fighter-bombers. Pakistan is developing capabilities for seabased nuclear weapons. According to Pakistani officials, Pakistan’s

Fig. 1. The number of warheads thought to be in the arsenals of Britain (blue),
France (red dashed), China (yellow dashed), India (purple), Pakistan (green),
and Israel (orange) (1–3). North Korean weapons are not shown because it is uncertain whether they have an arsenal of useable weapons.
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weapons are disassembled, and the parts are stored in several separate
locations to reduce the possibility that terrorists might capture a
usable weapon (6). Using satellite images, expert studies, and local
news reports, Kristensen and Norris (2) identify nine locations in
Pakistan where nuclear weapons may be stored.
On the basis of the sizes of weapons tested by Pakistan in 1998, it
is estimated that the current weapons have yields of 5 to 12 kt (6, 8).
However, much higher yields are theoretically possible, which could
greatly increase both casualties and global environmental effects.
Pakistani scientists claim that all the weapons they tested in 1998 were
uranium-based, boosted fission weapons that can have yields of
hundreds of kilotons, without the need to develop more complex
two-stage fission-fusion weapons. The 1998 tests did not demonstrate
such high yields, and it is unknown whether Pakistan has been able
to produce and deploy such high-yield warheads. Kristensen et al.
(4) discuss the limited evidence of availability of tritium in Pakistan,
which would be needed to allow boosted weapons to be produced.
Advanced states are motivated to use boosted fission and two-stage
weapons because they are smaller and lighter weight than fission
weapons of the same yield, making them easier to deliver by missiles
or aircraft. Boosted weapons also require less uranium or plutonium
for a given yield.
Pakistan has produced tactical nuclear weapons for use on battlefields to counter the conventional weapons advantage of an invading
Indian army. Their current arsenal probably includes 24 tactical
weapons of unknown yield, but perhaps in the range of 5 to 12 kt
(6). Tactical and strategic weapons (which are used to attack targets
distant from a battlefield) can overlap in yield. The yields of advanced
boosted fission weapons can be adjusted across a large range from
sub-kilotons to more than 100 kt. Tactical weapons may be less
secure than strategic ones and may lower the threshold for nuclear
weapons use (6).
The 2018 arsenal of India is thought to contain 130 to 140 nuclear
warheads, which may expand to 200 by 2025 (5). Kristensen and
Norris (2) list five locations in India where nuclear weapons may be
stored, but they estimate that there are others whose physical locations
have not been identified.
India has nuclear-capable aircraft including Mirage 2000H and
Jaguar IS/IB, with ranges up to 1850 km. It has four types of landbased ballistic missiles that have been deployed with ranges up to
3200 km and two others that are under development with ranges up
to 5200 km. The range of these missiles allows India to reach all of
Pakistan now, as well as all of China when its new missiles are deployed. India also has one deployed ship-based ballistic missile and
two submarine-based missiles in development (9). Since Pakistan
has about 60 cities with more than 100,000 people, India could
potentially attack each moderate- or large-sized city in Pakistan
with two nuclear warheads using its current arsenal and four warheads if its arsenal grows to 250 weapons by 2025.
On the basis of the sizes of weapons tested by India in 1998, the
current weapons may have yields of 12 to 40 kt. However, higher
yields are possible. India claims to have tested a two-stage weapon
in 1998, but the recorded yield did not indicate a successful design.
Kanwal (10), a retired Brigadier, examines the ideas of many Indian
military leaders and suggests an Indian nuclear arsenal in 2011–2020
with 150 warheads, of which 134 have yields of 200 kt, whereas in
2021–2030, the arsenal might contain 200 warheads all of 200-kt yield.
Although India does not need so many weapons to attack Pakistan,
India is also concerned about China. China has about 360 cities with
Toon et al., Sci. Adv. 2019; 5 : eaay5478
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more than 100,000 inhabitants, so it is possible that India is sizing
its nuclear forces in case of a nuclear conflict with China.
Scenario for war
Neither Pakistan nor India is likely to initiate a nuclear conflict
without substantial provocation. India has declared a policy of no first
use of nuclear weapons, except in response to an attack with biological
or chemical weapons (5). Pakistan has declared that it would only
use nuclear weapons if it could not stop an invasion by conventional
means or if it were attacked by nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the
two countries have had four conventional wars (1947, 1965, 1971,
and 1999) and many skirmishes with substantial loss of life since the
partition of British India in 1947. Therefore, the possibility of conventional war becoming nuclear is of concern.
Lavoy and Smith (11) discuss three plausible scenarios for a nuclear
war between India and Pakistan. India has conventional military
superiority. India is also geographically much larger than Pakistan.
One possible route to nuclear war involves a conventional conflict
between India and Pakistan. If Pakistan perceived that India were
about to successfully invade them, that would put pressure on Pakistan
to launch its nuclear weapons before they were overrun by the superior conventional Indian forces. Another possibility for starting a
nuclear conflict is that India or Pakistan could lose control of its
command and control structures due to an attack on them by the
other side or possibly an attack by terrorists from within India or
Pakistan or from another country. In such a scenario, it is not clear
who might be in control of the nuclear forces and what steps they
might take. A third possibility for starting a nuclear conflict is that
India or Pakistan might mistake an attack by conventional forces,
or even military exercises, for an attack by nuclear forces.
To help evaluate the consequences of a nuclear conflict between
India and Pakistan, table S1 provides a specific scenario for a war
assumed to take place in 2025. Although this scenario has Pakistan
first launching nuclear weapons, we do not mean to imply that they
are more likely to do this than India. Because large numbers of
weapons are assumed to be used by both sides, we would expect our
results to be similar no matter how the war started. Moreover, we
would expect the global outcomes projected here to apply equally
well—with relevant recalibration for weapon sizes and targets and
related smoke emissions—to any nuclear conflict between nuclear-
armed states that involves a corresponding total yield detonated
essentially in urban areas.
Many scenarios of an India-Pakistan conflict in 2025 are possible,
ranging from no nuclear weapons deployed to as many as 500
nuclear weapons—many with yields above 100 kt—detonated. We
chose the scenario outlined in table S1 as plausible following advice
from a number of military and policy experts. In addition, the information presented in this paper and the Supplementary Materials
can be used as a basis to compute the results for other scenarios. The
main determinants of casualties and climate effects are the number
of weapons used, the yield of the weapons, and the targets for the
weapons, each of which is unknown in advance. The discussion in
the following paragraphs exemplifies scenario factors that have been
widely considered in the literature concerning conflicts between India
and Pakistan, which might be varied in alternative scenarios including
the role of the number of potential targets in choosing the sizes of
arsenals; the characteristics, such as failure rates, of available weapons
and delivery systems; the events that might lead to an escalating
nuclear conflict; resolution of the Kashmir problem that might lessen
2 of 13
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the likelihood of a dangerous confrontation; the importance of
urban targets in contributing to fatalities and climate effects owing
to high population densities and fuel loadings; the difficulty of preventing a conflict from going nuclear because of the destabilizing
effects of tactical nuclear weapons on both sides; the importance of
Indian concerns about China in making it difficult for Pakistan and
India to reduce their nuclear stockpiles; and the possible role of the
disproportionate sizes of the countries, militaries, and populations
of India and Pakistan in motivating the initial use of nuclear weapons.
In the scenario outlined in table S1, we assumed that each country
would have 250 nuclear weapons in 2025 (5, 9). We also adopted a
highly simplified scenario in which only urban targets are considered,
and these are attacked using airbursts. Many military or strategic
targets in rural areas are likely to be attacked as well, but these
would involve smaller populations and lower fuel loading, which
would not add significantly to the near-term fatalities or smoke
emissions. Therefore, we do not specifically track them in our scenario.
Likewise, some targets, such as buried military facilities, might attract
ground bursts, which would produce significant radioactive fallout
and many additional fatalities—effects that are not explicitly considered in this work.
India has one of the largest conventional militaries in the world,
with about 1.4 million active duty personnel. India has not deployed
tactical nuclear weapons. Indian nuclear strategy requires that a significant number of high-yield bombs be held back in case China
joins a war on the side of Pakistan (10). Because Pakistan is a small
country with only about 60 cities with more than 100,000 people,
India would not need all of its 250 weapons to destroy Pakistan’s cities.
We assume that India will keep 100 nuclear weapons in its arsenal
to deter China from entering the war. Chinese involvement would
greatly amplify the destruction discussed below. As China expands
its presence in Pakistan as part of the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor, which is an element of China’s broader “Belt and Road
Initiative,” the odds of a Pakistani-Indian war spreading to China
would appear to be increasing.
Of India’s 150 weapons that can be used against Pakistan, we
assume that about 15% will fail. In this case, failure is primarily due
to the weapons not being delivered or failing to explode. Most urban
targets in Pakistan are so large that precise targeting is not needed
to hit them. Therefore, our scenario suggests 125 weapons actually
exploding. We further assume that there are 25 targets in Pakistan
that are isolated military bases or industrial facilities located in regions
with low populations and little combustible material. We do not
include these in computing fatalities or environmental damage. Therefore, we assume that India has 100 strategic nuclear weapons to use
on urban countervalue targets or military counterforce targets that
are located within urban areas, such as military bases, industrial
facilities, oil refineries, nuclear weapons facilities, and airports.
Pakistan also has one of the largest militaries in the world, with
about half as many active duty personnel as India has. We assume
that, in 2025, Pakistan will have 50 tactical weapons with yields of
5 kt to be used against an invading Indian army. We assume that 20%
of these will fail or be overrun by the Indian Army. Many of these
tactical weapons might be used in sparsely populated areas with little
flammable material. Accordingly, we only consider the remaining
200 strategic weapons when computing fatalities or smoke created
from fires. Of these 200 strategic weapons, we assume that 15% will
fail to be delivered to the target but that the remaining 170 will be
detonated over their targets. We further assume that 20 of these exToon et al., Sci. Adv. 2019; 5 : eaay5478
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plosions will be over isolated military, nuclear, or industrial areas.
The balance, 150 weapons, will thus be used against India’s urban
countervalue targets and military counterforce targets located within
urban areas.
The yields of modern Indian and Pakistani weapons are unknown
and not easily constrained. India detonated a ~40-kt yield weapon
in 1998, which, they claimed, was a two-stage bomb. Kanwal (10)
suggests that this design could produce 200-kt yields. Pakistan
claimed that its weapons tested in 1998 used boosted fission. Possibly,
these could also produce yields of 200 kt. Given the lack of reliable
information about yield, we will explore the consequences of using
strategic weapons with yields of 15, 50, and 100 kt.
Our scenario, as outlined in table S1, begins with a terrorist attack
on the Indian government, similar to the one that occurred on
13 December 2001, but with massive fatalities among members of
India’s government. As happened in January 2002, we assume that
India and Pakistan mobilize their troops within a few weeks of the
terrorist attack. Indian troops would likely be dispersed along the
border and in Kashmir. Skirmishes would break out, resulting in
deaths on both sides. Similar skirmishes happened in 2002 and now
occur with regularity, most recently with a conflict in the Kashmir
region beginning with a terrorist event on 14 February 2019. In the
2002 confrontation, the United States, Russia, and other countries
intervened, eventually convincing India and Pakistan to end the
confrontation, which had continued into the summer of 2002 until
Pakistan agreed to control terrorist groups within its borders.
A crisis simulation exercise in Sri Lanka during 2013 organized
by the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and involving retired senior
military and civilian analysts from India and Pakistan found that “a
limited war in South Asia will escalate rapidly into a full war with a
high potential for nuclear exchange” (12). In our scenario, with the
Indian government having been severely damaged, the Indian Army
brings a number of tanks to the border and crosses into Pakistan
and also crosses the Line of Control in Kashmir. On day 1 of the
nuclear conflict, Pakistan uses 10 tactical atomic bombs with 5-kt
yield inside its own borders with low air bursts against the Indian
tanks (table S1).
The conflict continues on day 2 when Pakistan uses another
15 tactical weapons with 5-kt yield on the battlefield, whereas India
detonates two air bursts against the Pakistani garrison in Bahawalpur
and deploys 18 other weapons to attack Pakistani airfields and
nuclear weapons depots, partially degrading Pakistani retaliatory
capabilities. Nevertheless, on day 3, Pakistan responds with a barrage
of nuclear ballistic and cruise missiles on garrisons, weapon depots,
naval bases, and airfields in 30 locations in Indian cities (30 air
bursts with 15- to 100-kt yield each) plus another 15 tactical bursts
with 5-kt yield. India also uses 10 strategic weapons against Pakistani
military bases on day 3. Because of panic, anger, miscommunication, and protocols, escalation cannot be stopped now. On days 4 to 7,
cities in India are hit with 120 strategic weapons, and those in Pakistan
are struck with 70 air bursts with 15- to 100-kt yield. In total, Pakistan’s
urban areas are hit with 100 nuclear weapons using airbursts, and
India’s urban areas are hit with 150 nuclear weapons using airbursts.
In addition, Pakistan has used 40 tactical nuclear weapons successfully and 20 strategic weapons successfully on targets not in urban
areas, whereas India has used 25 strategic weapons successfully on
targets not in urban areas.
In previous simulations (13, 14), all of the smoke produced during
the nuclear exchange (as described below) was initially distributed
3 of 13
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uniformly over a broad area of India and Pakistan in January 1.
Here, the smoke is injected above individual targeted urban regions
(at the grid scale of the climate model) on the day of the detonations.
Hence, the smoke injection varies in location and time in accordance
with the evolution of the specific war scenario (e.g., as illustrated in
fig. S1 for the scenario with 50-kt weapons). Further, in the present
climate simulations, the smoke injection is assumed to start on 15 May
and extend over the duration of the exchange (e.g., 6 days for the
case in fig. S1). We did not evaluate the sensitivity of the results to
the time of year the war begins. In (14), it was found that a war initiated on 1 January or 15 May made little difference to the ultimate
climatic effects. On the other hand, a war occurring in Northern
Hemisphere summer might lead to enhanced impacts initially, as
implied by earlier nuclear winter studies.
RESULTS

Near-term fatalities and casualties from nuclear
explosions in India and Pakistan: Regional catastrophe
World War II experience
A considerable amount of information about the direct effects of
nuclear explosions was gained from the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki during World War II (WWII) and through the
approximately 520 above-ground nuclear test explosions conducted
before the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Much of this information is
summarized by Glasstone and Dolan (15) for generic topographical
situations. Of course, the nuclear weapons tests took place in areas
with little combustible material to prevent large-scale fires, so the tests
provide little information about ignition of fires and fire behavior in
urban areas. The area destroyed in the nuclear explosions over Japanese
cities in WWII was greater in Hiroshima (yield, ~15 kt) than in
Nagasaki (yield, ~20 kt), probably due to differences in topography
(15). The bombed portion of Nagasaki is located in a valley, whereas
Hiroshima is located in a flat terrain. Therefore, in reality, not all
nuclear explosions follow the simple equations relating yields to destruction derived for flat terrain.
About 20 min after the Hiroshima nuclear explosion, a firestorm
grew from the many small fires ignited directly or indirectly by the
explosion. On the basis of the inflowing winds, the mass fire fully
developed 2 to 3 hours after the explosion and died down around
6 hours after the explosion (15). The energy released in this mass fire
may have been more than 1000 times greater than the energy released in the nuclear bomb blast (16). The area burned was about
11.4 km2 according to Glasstone and Dolan (15) and 13 km2 according
to Ishikawa and Swain (17).
Regional nuclear war casualty estimates
Even one nuclear weapon explosion in a city can do a great deal of
damage. For example, in the most densely populated urban area in
Pakistan, a 15-kt airburst at the optimum height to maximize blast
damage could kill about 700,000 people (fig. S2B) and injure another
300,000. With a 100-kt airburst over the same region, roughly 2 million
fatalities and an additional 1.5 million nonfatal casualties could occur.
Similar numbers would result for nuclear explosions over large Indian
cities (fig. S2A).
Toon et al. (16) estimated that a war between India and Pakistan
involving 50 nuclear weapons with 15-kt yield detonated as airbursts
over the most densely populated cities of each nation would lead to
about 22 million immediate fatalities and 44 million total casualties.
Toon et al., Sci. Adv. 2019; 5 : eaay5478
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Casualties include fatalities, severe injuries, and lesser injuries that
can develop into more serious conditions, especially in the aftermath
of a nuclear attack. At that time, it was assumed (16) that India had
85 (65 to 110) nuclear weapons and Pakistan had 52 (44 to 62), all
with 15-kt yields. These casualty and fatality estimates were made
using the LandScan2003 (18) population database together with the
Gaussian probability distribution for fatalities and total casualties
versus distance from ground zero shown in fig. S3 (16).
However, the urban populations of India and Pakistan are growing
rapidly. The total urban populations of India and Pakistan are projected to increase by about 90% between 2000 and 2025, as shown in
fig. S4 (19). The number of weapons possessed by the two countries
is also thought to be increasing rapidly. By 2025, India and Pakistan
could have three and five times, respectively, the number of weapons
estimated by Toon et al. (16), and these would likely have higher
yields than previously estimated (16).
We have recomputed the fatalities and casualties for the most
recent Indian and Pakistani urban population counts using the
approach discussed in Methods (see below) and in Toon et al. (16).
Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative fatalities and cumulative total
casualties as a function of the number of explosions and their yield
derived using the LandScan2016 (20) population database. The corresponding fatalities calculated for individual targets are given in
the Supplementary Materials (fig. S2). Cumulative fatalities (as well
as overall casualties) are higher in India because it has a greater urban
population. Fatalities are not linear with respect to the number, or
yield, of the weapons used, because smaller cities (of which there are
greater numbers) have lower populations, whereas higher-yield
weapons on these targets would encounter low-density suburban or
rural areas away from the city centers where lower-yield weapons
concentrate most of their damage. Compared with India, Pakistani
fatalities (fig. S2B) vary less with weapon yield above 15 kt, especially
after the most densely populated 100 targets have been attacked, due
to the relatively low populations of the remaining targets. India has
many more moderate-sized cities than Pakistan, and fatalities continue
to grow rapidly with yield above 15 kt, even for the 250th target (fig. S2A).
For 50 weapons of 15-kt yield exploding on both India and Pakistan,
we find that the casualty estimates have risen relative to Toon et al.
(16) from 22 to 27 million fatalities and from 44 to 45 million total casualties (Fig. 2) due to the expanded urban populations in
LandScan2016 (20) compared to LandScan2003 (18). These increases
in fatalities and casualties are much less than the ~50% increase in
urban population between 2000 and 2015 (fig. S4), suggesting that
the size of the area that is urban increases more than the population
density within the urban region.
An even more marked increase in fatalities and casualties shown in
Fig. 2 is due to increasing numbers of weapons and increasing yields.
In Fig. 2, the targets are graphed in decreasing order of the population
density within the target area [refer to Methods and (16)]. In the
scenario outlined in table S1, Pakistan is assumed to use 150 strategic
weapons on Indian urban targets and India is assumed to use
100 weapons on Pakistani urban targets. The calculations use the
current population of India and Pakistan, not those for 2025, because it is
not possible to forecast changing populations in individual target areas.
Targets that are not in urban areas are not considered, but they would
lead to additional fatalities and casualties. Table S2 lists the fatalities
and casualties from the scenario given in table S1. About 50 million
people would die if 15-kt weapons are used, almost 100 million if 50-kt
weapons are used, and about 125 million if 100-kt weapons are used.
4 of 13
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Fig. 2. The fatalities (solid lines) and total casualties (dashed lines) in millions, immediately following nuclear attacks, versus the number of targets. Results
for India (A) and Pakistan (B). Colors corespond to the yield assumed.

The population density in the target area affects the casualties, as
well as the estimated fuel load. Table S3 lists the population and
population densities for the densest urban areas attacked and the least
dense. The population density in the target area usually declines as
the yield increases because more suburban areas are included in the
larger areas that are damaged by higher-yield weapons. In some cases,
especially for low-population regions in Pakistan, the population may
decrease with yield because different urban areas are chosen as the
last target for differing yields. The highest population densities in
table S3 are in the range of 37,000 to 80,000 people/km2. The population density in the area of the mass fire in Hamburg during WWII
is estimated to have been about 20,000 people/km2 (21). Similarly,
the population density for the 150th weapon used on India is between
17,000 and 4900 people/km2 and that for the 100th weapon used on
Pakistan is between 8500 and 1600 people/km2. For reference, the
population density of 1980s San Jose, California, a suburban city,
was estimated to be about 1300 people/km2 (16).
During WWII, it is estimated that about 50 million people were
killed, not considering those who died from disease and starvation
over 6 years [e.g., (22)]. Because of the dense populations of cities in
Pakistan and India, table S2 shows that even a war with 15-kt weapons
could lead to fatalities approximately equal to those worldwide in
WWII and a war with 100-kt weapons could directly kill about
2.5 times as many as died worldwide in WWII, and in this nuclear
war, the fatalities could occur in a single week. The world’s annual
death rate from all causes is about 56 million people per year (23).
Therefore, a war between India and Pakistan in our scenario with
15-kt weapons could kill the same number of people in a week as
would die naturally worldwide in a year, effectively increasing the
immediate global death rate by a factor of 50. A regional catastrophe
would occur if India and Pakistan were to engage in a full-scale nuclear
war with their expanding arsenals.
India would suffer two to three times more fatalities and casualties
than Pakistan (table S2) because, in our scenario, Pakistan uses more
weapons than India and because India has a much larger population
and more densely populated cities. However, as a percentage of the
urban population, Pakistan’s losses would be about twice those of
India. In general, as shown in Fig. 2, the fatalities and casualties
increase rapidly even up to the 250th explosion due to the high population in India, whereas the rate of increase for Pakistan is much
lower even for the 50th explosion.
The fatalities and casualties outlined in table S2, Fig. 2, and fig. S2
are computed, assuming airbursts used against urban targets, and
Toon et al., Sci. Adv. 2019; 5 : eaay5478
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that mass fires were started in each city, as occurred in Hiroshima.
It is likely that some of the 45 strategic weapons assumed to be used
against isolated military targets, and some of the 40 tactical weapons,
will be exploded as ground bursts. The direct casualties and fatalities
from ground bursts may be relatively small. However, ground bursts
carry soil into the fireball, where very small radioactive particles can
attach themselves to the dust particles. The relatively large dust particles are likely to fall out of the atmosphere within a few days, when
the radioactive particles are still very dangerous. Large numbers of
fatalities and casualties, potentially larger than the values given in
table S2 and Fig. 2, can be caused by exposure to this radioactive
material within a few days of the explosions.
Other considerations
Although the probability curves used here to determine fatalities and
total casualties caused by airbursts have been crudely “calibrated”
by the experience during WWII, the current estimates for a modern
regional conflict involves a number of uncertainties that are difficult
to reduce. Among the principal unknowns are the target points and
the number and size of weapons used. There are many possible
scenarios for a war, which can only be speculated upon in advance.
Moreover, local environmental conditions—winds, humidity, precipitation, and so on—must be assumed from a wide range of possibilities. However, the core factual basis for the present estimates has
been established through independent studies cited above. One can
also question the use of probability curves based on data from Hiroshima
in determining the ability of people in 21st-century cities to survive
a nearby nuclear explosion. The probability curves adopted here
correspond to physical processes triggered by nuclear detonations
(principally thermal radiation and blast) that are likely to be lethal
even in modern buildings and settings (fig. S3). We do not differentiate
casualties between mass fires in high winds, where conflagrations
occur and fire spread is likely (24, 25), and mass fires in low winds,
where firestorms develop and limited spreading is expected, as there
is insufficient information available to make such a distinction
quantitatively. Fire spread is likely to increase the ultimate casualty
number, but it may also allow more people to flee from the fire.
Global climate perturbations due to nuclear conflict
between India and Pakistan: Global catastrophe
Turco et al. (26, 27) showed that smoke from fires started in cities
by nuclear explosions could cool Earth’s climate so much that agriculture would fail globally, leading to mass starvation. These early
studies are supported by current climate model simulations (28, 29).
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Following a full-scale nuclear war involving the United States, Europe,
Russia, and China using current arsenals, Toon et al. (30) estimated
that 180 Tg (1 Tg = 1 Mt = 1012 g) of black carbon (BC) could be
generated by a total of 4400 explosions of 100-kt weapons in urban
areas, about half the arsenals of Russia, China, Britain, France, and
the United States, assuming a yield that is lower than the average
yield. Robock et al. (28), using a modern global climate model and
assuming 150 Tg of smoke emitted in a superpower nuclear war
[consistent with (30)], predicted a full-blown nuclear winter, with
temperatures in mid-latitude grain-growing regions held below
freezing for several years, destroying much of the world’s agricultural
productivity.
Robock et al. (31) and Toon et al. (16) showed that a conflict
between India and Pakistan with 50 weapons of 15-kt yield used by
each side that generated 5 Tg of BC would produce large climate
changes as supported by additional studies with other models
(13, 14, 32, 33). Mills et al. (13, 14) also found large ozone losses.
These climate changes are large enough to significantly damage
agriculture worldwide (34–36). Here, we compute the smoke-generated
and climate changes for the scenario outlined in table S1 for possible
Pakistani and Indian nuclear arsenals of 2025.
Smoke and BC (soot) emission estimates
As discussed by Toon et al. (16, 30), we compute the amount and
properties of smoke lofted to the upper troposphere in a sequence
of steps, which are outlined below.
1. We first assume that the area subject to fire ignition for a 15-kt
nuclear explosion is the same as that observed in Hiroshima (13 km2).
For different yields, we take the area subject to fire as proportional
to the yield (15).
2. The fuel loading in the fire zone is determined using a recent
population database (20) by allocating to each person in the area burned
11,000 kg of flammable material consisting of construction materials,
furnishings, clothing, asphalt roofs, plastics, fuels, and other flammables in their homes, places of work, schools, stores, gas stations,
and so on. This fuel allocation is based on studies of the quantities
of combustible materials present in the developed world in the
1980s (27), as well as limited specific assessments of actual fuel
availability in the relatively densely populated urban area of WWII
Hamburg, Germany (various estimates yielding 12 to 47 g/cm2), and
more sparsely populated 1990 residential San Jose, California
(1.34 g/cm2) (14, 37).
Reisner et al. (38) introduced a new technique to determine fuel
loads in the United States using census data for urban fuels. Our
estimated fuel load for their sparsely populated target location near
Atlanta (0.87 g/cm2) is within about 20% of their value. We have
also used urban data from Washington, DC, to project a fuel load of
4 g/cm2, which agrees within a few percentage with the mass per
person estimated in (27). Larson and Small (39) suggested that,
within the inner 2-km radius of urban cores in three classes of
American cities circa 1980, fuel loadings were 23, 41, and 63 g/cm2.
Fuel loads in the major cities of Pakistan and India—summarized in
table S3—are generally predicted to be in that same range. Unfortunately, less information is available to test these fuel values for Pakistan
and India. Although Toon et al. (16) suggest that fuel burdens might
be only half as large in the less developed world as in the developed
world, this result is skewed by the inclusion of rural areas in the
overall estimate. More directly, fuel loadings in Indian office buildings were found to be similar to those in British office buildings (40).
In summary, considering the urban fuel loading models and data
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currently available, we conclude that there is a general, if somewhat tentative, consistency among the various studies mentioned
above.
3. With regard to fire behavior, we assume that either (i) a firestorm
would develop following a nuclear detonation in some number of
cities, as happened at Hiroshima (and following the conventional
bombing of Hamburg during WWII, for example), or (ii) a largescale spreading conflagration would evolve in other urban areas, as
happened with the conventional bombing of Tokyo and other cities
during WWII. Further, in either case (i) or (ii), we assume that
similar total quantities of fuel would eventually be consumed, and
similar amounts of smoke would be lofted, after taking into account
fire behavior (see the discussion below and also item 4). One characteristic that is not explicitly factored into our calculations is the
difference in the period of time each type of fire would last, in general
being longer for a conflagration as compared to a firestorm. This
factor is not significant for the present global climate analysis.
Following Glasstone and Dolan (15), firestorms result when
“many fires merge to form a single convective column ... rising from
the burning area” and with “strong, fire-induced radial (inwardly
directed) winds … virtually everything combustible within the
firestorm area is eventually destroyed.” On the basis of WWII experience with 69 mass fires in Japan and others in Germany, Glasstone
and Dolan (15) conclude that firestorms can occur under the following
conditions: a fuel loading of at least 4 g/cm2, half the structures in an
area aflame simultaneously, ambient winds less than 3.6 m/s, and a
minimum burning area of about 1.3 km2. For a 15-kt explosion, the
minimum required fire ignition area is exceeded by roughly an
order of magnitude. Table S3 also indicates that fuel loads needed to
establish firestorms are generally exceeded, except in the case of
large-yield weapons detonated over smaller Pakistani cities, where
the requisite fuel load may be exceeded only within the city center.
Moreover, it is clear that wind speeds may exceed the threshold for
firestorm formation in some places at certain times. The WWII
mass fires were generally much smaller than those that would be
started by nuclear weapons considered here, so these firestorm conditions may not be applicable.
Mass fires, consisting of numerous fires burning simultaneously
over a large area, may grow into massive conflagrations instead of
firestorms when winds are high. Conflagrations have moving fire
fronts and can continue to spread as long as there is sufficient fuel.
High winds can drive and intensify such fires. Conflagrations,
unlike firestorms, may be started at a single ignition point and are
commonly associated with large forest fires burning along a widening
frontal line. Conflagrations in forests generally consume readily
ignitable fuels, such as the crowns of the trees and forest undergrowth, but not living tree trunks [for example, see (41, 42)]. However, nuclear conflagrations in urban areas would likely be much
more intense—owing to the many simultaneous starting points and
heavy, highly flammable fuel loading. Moreover, given their propensity to spread outside of the initial ignition zone, conflagrations
in urban settings could eventually consume as much fuel as a
stationary firestorm, and perhaps more. Intense conflagrations are
also observed to deposit smoke in the upper troposphere, and even
the lower stratosphere, presumably by inducing strong pyroconvection
at the fire front (41–44). Accordingly, both firestorms and conflagrations ignited by nuclear fireballs may ultimately have similar
impacts on fuel consumption and, depending on fire intensity, smoke
injection heights.
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4. An important assumption in the present work is that all of the
available fuel in the initial target-area fire zone is consumed when a
firestorm develops. Although it is clear that this would be an upper
limit, several factors mitigate toward this result. For example, accounts
from WWII urban firestorms, such as those in Hiroshima and
Hamburg, are consistent with nearly complete fuel consumption.
Firefighting and suppression in nuclear attack zones would be effectively impossible, allowing fires to burn to completion. In addition,
blast waves would release and disperse highly flammable fuels from
storage tanks of all sizes, as well as piping and pipelines, and shatter
and expose otherwise shielded fuels such as framing and building
contents, leading to a more violent conflagration. Accordingly, the
massive size and intensity of nuclear urban fires would most likely
incinerate or pyrolyze a much larger fraction of available fuel than
with smaller-scale localized combustion.
On the other hand, it is also likely that in blast-damaged regions
of a city center, some otherwise available fuel would be covered by
rubble and would not completely burn. In a nuclear airburst, reinforced
concrete structures within the 140-kPa (20 psi) blast overpressure
region can be destroyed. However, if the height of burst is optimized
to produce such a blast pressure, the area of such destruction for a 15-kt
airburst represents roughly 14% of the area within the 400,000 J m−2
(~10 cal cm−2) fire ignition zone, and for a 100-kt blast, roughly 8%.
Since, in most cases, the fuel density would be greater in the high
overpressure zone, a larger fraction of the total fuel in the fire zone
would be effectively buried—perhaps 20% or more, depending on
the precise targets and weapons used. Owing to other sources of
uncertainty in the fuel consumption estimation and the difficulty in
determining a reasonable fuel sequestration factor due to rubble, we
have ignored this effect in the current analysis until more information
is available.
In the case of conflagrations, we allow that 50% of the fuel within
the initial ignition zone would be burned, but that fire spread outside
the area affected by thermal pulse would effectively double the fuel
eventually consumed (24, 25). These assumptions are not inconsistent
with a significant impact on fuel consumption due to rubble formation
in the blast zone.
5. We use an average BC (or soot) emission factor for burned
fuel based on studies summarized by Turco et al. (26), yielding 0.02 g
BC/g fuel burned. The less-absorbing organic carbon fraction of
smoke that is typically mixed with the BC is ignored here. Other
independent estimates of the total mass of emitted smoke may or
may not include the mass of organic carbon in addition to BC.
Accordingly, some care must be taken in comparing smoke estimates
from different sources, as well as those quoted in assessments of
impacts. The measured BC fraction of smoke can range widely from
close to 90% to less than a few percentage, depending on the material
burned and the flaming conditions that apply. For example, flaming
combustion in forest fires may have a modest BC component,
whereas the smoldering smoke has very little BC. On the other
hand, burning fossil fuels have very high BC content. Our adopted
average BC emission factor above has been derived by considering
the range of fuel types and combustion conditions expected under
nuclear attack scenarios (16, 26, 27, 45).
6. Considering several studies summarized in (16, 27), we assume
that smoke generated by all nuclear bomb fires is initially injected
into the 300- to 150-hPa pressure region of the upper troposphere
(~9 to ~13.5 km). For latitudes from the equator to 35°N in the area
of India and Pakistan, the cold point tropopause is in the 16- to 19-km
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altitude range (46). Therefore, we do not inject any smoke directly
into the stratosphere. However, any smoke that might stabilize in
the lower troposphere may be lofted too high.
7. On the basis of limited observations of pyrocumulus clouds
(16), we assume that 20% of the BC is removed by rainfall during
injection into the upper troposphere. Further smoke is rained out
by the climate model before the smoke is lofted into the stratosphere
by solar heating of the smoke. The fraction of the injected mass that
is present in the model over 15 years is shown in fig. S5. In the first
few days after the injection, 10 to 15% of the smoke is removed in
the climate model before reaching the stratosphere. Therefore, in
total, 30 to 35% of the smoke is removed by rainfall before it enters
the stratosphere.
Uncertainty in smoke parameters
It is clear that imprecise knowledge regarding fire ignition and growth,
and smoke composition, emission, and lofting, which are closely
related to fuel loading and consumption, introduces significant uncertainty into all nuclear war climatic scenarios. Although all of these
uncertain factors have been discussed extensively in the literature
[e.g., (16, 26, 27, 47)], some of the key parameters have not yet been
sufficiently constrained to provide final assurance in climate predictions. Moreover, the parameterization of nuclear-initiated fires
used in this work is, by necessity, highly simplified and not specific
to any particular potential target. Nevertheless, there has been sufficient
vetting of the physics and chemistry of potential nuclear warfare—
including actual experience with nuclear attacks on cities in addition
to large-scale testing, studies of basic processes under laboratory and
field conditions, and theoretical modeling and analysis at all relevant
spatial and temporal scales—that we consider the results presented
here to be the most realistic currently possible.
There have been contrary assessments of the possible impacts of
nuclear attacks on the global climate and environment. For example,
most recently, a high-resolution modeling study (38) purported to
demonstrate that a nuclear fire initiated by a 15-kt explosion in India
or Pakistan would not loft enough smoke into the upper troposphere
to contribute to widespread effects. However, that conclusion was
based on a single simulation of such a detonation over a sparsely
populated area about 8 km from the city center of Atlanta, Georgia.
Significantly, the adopted fuel loading in the affected area (1.07 g/cm2
in the ignition zone) was about one order of magnitude smaller than
that in the most sparsely populated urban area considered in the
present study, i.e., the 100th city attacked in Pakistan (refer to table S3).
Accordingly, the preliminary findings in (38) are not representative
of the fires that need to be considered in assessing the potential impacts
of a conceivable nuclear conflict having regional or global extent.
Smoke emission scenarios
Because our global climate model has limited spatial and temporal
resolutions compared to the scales of individual nuclear blast zones
and fires, the smoke emissions determined for various attack scenarios
have been inserted into the climate model, consistent with model
resolution and the smoke parameterization described earlier.
Figure 3 shows the cumulative mass of BC that is inserted into
the 300- to 150-hPa region (after rainout), with targets number-
ordered by population. The BC emitted by individual targets is
illustrated in fig. S2, which shows that, depending on yield, 10 to
25 targets in Pakistan and 15 to 125 cities in India could each produce
more than 0.1 Tg of BC. Nuclear explosions in Pakistan generate far
less BC than those in India for the same yield owing to the lower
populations in Pakistan and the less dense urban areas after approximately
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Fig. 3. Mass of black carbon (BC) injected into the atmosphere after prompt
rainout (300- to 150-hPa region) for a given number of targets ordered by the
population. Indian targets are given as dotted lines, whereas Pakistan targets are
given as solid lines. Color coding designates yield.

the 10 most populated cities are considered. The total BC emitted
from a war in which 50 weapons with a 15-kt yield are used to attack
each country is about 8.7 Tg. Toon et al. (16) estimated that 6.6 Tg
would be generated using the LandScan2003 database. The 30%
increase in predicted BC emissions between 2003 and 2016 is due to
the growing urban populations over this period, as shown in fig. S4
(by ~50% between 2000 and 2016).
For the scenario in table S1 with 100 nuclear weapons used by
India on Pakistan and 150 nuclear weapons used by Pakistan on India,
there are (Fig. 3) 16.1 Tg of BC injected into the upper troposphere
(11 from India and 5.1 from Pakistan) for yields of 15 kt, 27.3 Tg
(19.8 from India and 7.5 from Pakistan) for 50-kt weapons, and 36.6 Tg
(27.5 from India and 9.1 from Pakistan) for 100-kt weapons. These
injection amounts are after considering the 20% removal of smoke
by precipitation in the rising pyrocumulus.
These BC injections are of considerable concern for the climate.
The greatest known natural injection of BC into the stratosphere of
~6 × 10−3 Tg occurred during August 2017 from forest fires in British
Columbia (42, 43). These fires led to radiatively forced rise of the
smoke from 12 to above 23 km in about 2 months, radiatively driven
hemispheric distribution of the smoke in the stratosphere, as well as
temperature changes in the smoky layer due to heating by smoke,
and ozone changes in the smoke due to vertical transport of low ozone
air from the troposphere. The amount of BC in our 15-kt scenario is
almost 3000 times more than in this forest fire injection.
In forest fires, only a small fraction of the fuel is consumed. The
values for fuel burned in the British Columbia forest fire (42) are 10
to 25% of the fuel load expected in boreal forests. In addition, the
accessible fuel loading is substantially lower in forests than in urban
areas. In total, the fuel burned in the urban areas in our 15-kt scenario
is about 60 times greater than estimated for typical forest fires. Our
BC emission fractions are also about 50 times greater than in the
forest fire case because the materials burned in urban mass fires produce more BC than does burning organic forest material in line fires.
Climate simulations
We have conducted a series of simulations using a configuration of
the National Science Foundation/Department of Energy (DOE)
Community Earth System Model (CESM) that is similar to that used
in (48) to simulate the climate and atmospheric chemistry after the
asteroid impact that killed the nonavian dinosaurs and many other
species 66 million years ago by igniting most of Earth’s land bioToon et al., Sci. Adv. 2019; 5 : eaay5478
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Fig. 4. Changes in amount of atmospheric aerosol and of solar energy at Earth’s surface after nuclear exchange. Visible wavelength aerosol optical depth versus time (A) and
the change in shortwave surface energy relative to normal as a function of time (B) for varying
amounts of BC emitted in the nuclear exchange. Color coding designates the BC injection.

mass and injecting about 15,000 Tg of BC into the upper atmosphere.
A brief outline of this model is given in Methods.
Figure 4 shows the visible wavelength aerosol optical depth and
the changes in solar energy at Earth’s surface. There are results for
six BC injections including the three scenarios defined in table S1
using possible yields of 15-, 50-, or 100-kt weapons, resulting in BC
injections of 16.1, 27.3, and 36.6 Tg, respectively. The 5-Tg case is
based on estimates made in 2008 for Indian and Pakistan arsenals at
that time (13, 14, 16, 31–36). The 46.8-Tg case would result from
250 weapons of 100-kt yield used against urban areas in India and
Pakistan, which is likely an upper limit for a conflict between India
and Pakistan, unless they have weapons with yields that are higher
than 100 kt. By way of contrast with earlier nuclear winter scenarios,
the green curves in Fig. 4 correspond to an injection of 150 Tg of BC
over Russia and the United States, based on a scenario for a major
nuclear war between these two superpowers (28–30).
The primary mechanism leading to climate changes after a
nuclear conflict is absorption of solar radiation by smoke from
burning cities. The direct solar beam is diminished in proportion to
the inverse of the exponential of the aerosol optical depth. The initial
global average aerosol optical depths range from less than 0.1 to
greater than 2 for the cases considered in Fig. 4A. After 9 years, the
150-Tg optical depth is about equal to the initial optical depth of the
5-Tg case. The optical depth in the 150-Tg case is lower than some
of the other cases after 10 years because the larger BC emission has
led to the formation of larger particles via coagulation, and these
have been more rapidly removed by sedimentation. The downward
solar energy (Fig. 4B) reaching the surface declines in proportion to
the increase of optical depth. The solar energy reaching the surface
before the war is about 160 W m−2. The fractional energy losses in
Fig. 4B range from ~20 to 40% (~32 to ~64 W m−2) for our conflict
scenario (table S1) over the range of possible yields of 15-, 50-, or
100-kt weapons. For reference, the maximum average solar radiative
loss following the Mt. Pinatubo volcanic eruption in 1991 was about
4 W m−2 (49), whereas the radiative reductions proposed for climate
geoengineering schemes to offset global warming due to greenhouse gas emissions are of a similar magnitude. In addition, by
comparison, a full-scale nuclear war between Russia and the United
States might produce a peak solar radiation loss at the surface of
~75% (120 W m−2) (28).
With a loss of solar radiation at the surface, the surface cools and
evaporation, convection, and precipitation are reduced. Figure 5A
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Fig. 5. Temporal variation in global precipitation and temperature following
a nuclear conflict. (A) Global average precipitation and (B) global average temperature,
expressed as a percentage of control run values. Color coding designates the amount
of BC emitted. The vertical purple bar represents the range of temperatures during the
height of the Last Glacial Maximum about 20,000 years ago.

indicates simulated global average precipitation losses from 15 to 30%
for our scenario over the range of possible yields of 15-kt (16.1 Tg of BC),
50-kt (27.3 Tg), or 100-kt (36.6 Tg) weapons. A war between the
United States and Russia could reduce precipitation by nearly 60%.
Figure 5B shows that the global average surface temperature drops
between 1.25° and 6.5°C over several years for our scenario. These
perturbations reach their peak about 3 years after the conflict and
are near the peak value for about 4 years. It takes more than a
decade for temperatures and precipitation to return to normal. The
Last Glacial Maximum, 20,000 years ago, had a global temperature
decline of about 3° to 8°C relative to preindustrial temperatures, but
these temperature decreases persisted for thousands of years (50).
Illustrations of postconflict temperature and precipitation anomalies over the major landmasses and oceans are presented in figs. S6
and S7. The average global land temperature (fig. S6B) declines by
as much as ~4° to ~8°C for the present war scenario over the range
of yields between 15 and 100 kt (BC emissions between 16 and 36 Tg).
In contrast, annual average temperature decreases over land had been
predicted to reach ~18°C for a full-scale nuclear winter. In the current
scenario, globally averaged ocean surface temperatures (fig. S6A)
decline by ~1 to almost 3°C for the range of yields assumed, whereas
predicted anomalies reached ~6°C in the case of a superpower nuclear conflict. The ocean temperatures are expected to decrease in a
layer extending roughly to the average thermocline depth [for example, as discussed in (48) for even larger smoke injections inferred
at the geologic boundary marking the extinction of the dinosaurs].
Although cooling and precipitation reduction are global in scale, these
changes vary regionally to a large extent. Postconflict temperature
anomalies over land and ocean surfaces for the 50-kt (27.3 Tg) scenario
are illustrated in fig. S6C, showing that cooling of the Northern
Hemisphere continents is stronger than that of the Southern Hemisphere;
temperature drops greater than 10°C occur across North America
and Europe north of about 30° latitude, with cooling up to 5°C over
all continents; ocean temperatures decrease in many regions by an
average of 5°C, with greater reductions in the Northwest Atlantic.
Similar spatial patterns of temperature anomalies were found for larger
and smaller soot injections. Postconflict precipitation anomalies over
land and oceans for the 50-kt (27.3 Tg) scenario are illustrated in
fig. S7. Increased precipitation occurs in some areas, mainly because
these regions are currently under the descending branches of the
Hadley circulation. The descending air normally suppresses rainfall,
but global cooling weakens the Hadley circulation, leading to more
Toon et al., Sci. Adv. 2019; 5 : eaay5478
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rainfall on average. Of greater significance to surviving populations
are the large decreases in rainfall predicted over densely populated
regions such as India and central China where precipitation almost
ceases. The U.S. Northeast and Midwest lose more than 50% of
their rainfall.
Although not illustrated here, and contrary to the response of
temperatures at the surface, stratospheric air temperatures increase
sharply because of sunlight absorption by injected BC (31–33). Such
heating has previously been shown to cause large depletions of
stratospheric ozone (13, 14). It might be worth noting at this point
that climate geoengineering proposals are based on reducing solar
insolation by injecting stratospheric particles—such as sulfuric acid
aerosol—that mainly scatter sunlight rather than absorbing it specifically to avoid the heating and ozone loss problem. However, sulfuric
acid particles may still lead to ozone depletion through surface-
catalyzed chemical reactions [e.g., (13, 14)].
Impact on net primary productivity
One measure of the impact of these climate changes on life on Earth
is the change in net primary productivity (NPP). NPP represents
the net amount of inorganic carbon (mainly in the form of carbon
dioxide) converted into organic plant matter through photosynthesis
after accounting for plant respiration. NPP is typically expressed as
grams of carbon per square meter per year (gC m−2 year−1), where
instantaneous rates of NPP may be scaled to equivalent annual values
(51). Like the climate simulations, NPP is calculated here using the
CESM, which includes both a land component [Community Land
Model (CLM)] and ocean biogeochemistry module [Biogeochemical
Elemental Cycling (BEC)]. These various models are more fully described in Methods. In CESM, NPP can be reduced on land through
reductions in solar radiation, temperature, and precipitation. In the
oceans, NPP can decrease in response to declines in solar radiation
and temperature and may be further modified through associated
changes in circulation and vertical mixing, which affect nutrient delivery and effective light availability.
Figure 6 (A and B) shows global ocean and land NPP variations,
respectively, for a range of war scenarios. Globally integrated ocean
NPP declines by a maximum of 10 to 20%, whereas terrestrial NPP
can drop by 15 to 30% for several years for the range of yields between
15 and 100 kt (Fig. 6). NPP recovers after about 10 years. Imhoff et al.
(51) estimated that the global annual land NPP is about 56.8 PgC/year
(1 Pg = 1015 g). They further estimated that humans use 8.00 to
14.81 PgC/year or about 14 to 26% of NPP. Therefore, the projected
loss of NPP is comparable to the total amount people use each year.
In some regions, large fractions of local land NPP are appropriated
by humans (51). For example, Western Europe uses 72%, south
central Asia uses 80%, and East Asia uses 63% of NPP. Most of India,
eastern China, parts of the Middle East, and areas of equatorial Africa
consume more than 100% of local NPP. Hence, in these places, there
is little or no margin for the loss of potential NPP following a regional nuclear conflict as described here.
For an India-Pakistan nuclear scenario using 50-kt weapons, terrestrial NPP reductions are much higher in the Northern Hemisphere than
in the global average (Fig. 6, C and D), reaching 100% at latitudes
north of about 60°N, averaged over the first 3 years after war. Major
crop-growing regions of North America and Eurasia experience
declines of NPP averaging 25 to 50% over this time. Very large reductions in NPP occur in India, China, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia, as
well as in tropical South America and Africa. Ocean reductions in
NPP are highest in the Arctic, where production is almost entirely
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Fig. 6. Net primary productivity after nuclear war. Globally integrated monthly averaged NPP as a percentage of the baseline (control run) values as a function of time: over
the oceans (A) and landmasses (B). Results are shown for each of the war scenarios described in the text. Color coding designates the corresponding BC injection amounts. As in
Fig. 5, the full nuclear winter injection case (150 Tg, green line) is shown for contrast. (C) Global distribution of annual average NPP for the baseline control run. (D) Change from
the baseline averaged over the second calendar year following a nuclear conflict, which starts in May of year 1 for the scenario with 50-kt weapons and a 27-Tg injection of BC.

extinguished. In addition, in many regions where major fisheries exist,
production is significantly reduced, including the North Atlantic
and North Pacific, where NPP decreases by 25 to 50%. Together, the
reductions in temperature, primary productivity, and precipitation
suggest major disruptions to human and natural systems worldwide.
DISCUSSION

India and Pakistan may be repeating the unfortunate example set by
the United States and Russia during the “cold war” era: that is,
building destructive nuclear forces far out of proportion to their role
in deterrence. Should a war between India and Pakistan ever occur,
as assumed here, these countries alone could suffer 50 to 125 million
fatalities, a regional catastrophe. In addition, severe short-term climate
perturbations, with temperatures declining to values not seen on
Earth since the middle of the last Ice Age, would be triggered by
smoke from burning cities, a global disaster threatening food production worldwide and mass starvation, as well as severe disruption
to natural ecosystems. Compounding the devastation brought upon
their own countries, decisions by Indian and Pakistani military
leaders and politicians to use nuclear weapons could severely affect
every other nation on Earth.
METHODS

To compute the number of fatalities and casualties from a nuclear
detonation in a specific location, we numerically integrated the
product of the spatially varying population density in that region
and the probability of fatality or casualty as a function of distance
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from the detonation point, or “ground zero,” using the probability
distribution curves defined in fig. S3. Total fatalities and casualties
for particular war scenarios were then determined by summing up
the results from individual bursts. For a 15-kt weapon, we chose
target sites by first calculating the total population within a 2-km
radius around each grid cell in the LandScan2016 population database
(20), where LandScan provides the 24-hour average population
aggregated into cells that are 30 arc sec on a side—an area less than
1 km2 at the latitudes of interest. Subsequently, we selected the most
populated of these 2-km-radius regions as target points. However,
we did not permit any of the 2-km zones to overlap, so that bursts are
spatially well separated. Moreover, we did not consider the accumulated
casualties from multiple bursts in overlapping damage zones. In practice,
for the most densely populated regions, fatalities from the blast and
thermal radiation of a 15-kt explosion did not occur beyond about
5 km from ground zero, and minor injuries did not occur beyond
about 9 km (fig. S3). For yields greater than 15 kt, we took the affected
area to scale linearly with yield and, thus, the population density target
search radius scales as the nominal 2-km radius times the square root
of the alternative yield divided by 15 kt [e.g., the 50-kt target population
density was calculated over an area of 2 × (50/15)1/2 ~3.7-km radius].
Further discussion of the target selection criteria and application to
nuclear war scenarios can be found in our earlier work [e.g., (16)].
We used the CESM (52–54), a fully coupled climate model that
includes atmosphere, ocean, land, and sea-ice components. We used
the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model (WACCM),
version 4, as the atmospheric component (55). WACCM is a “hightop” chemistry-climate model, with an upper boundary located near
140-km geometric altitude; it has a horizontal resolution of 1.9° × 2.5°
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(latitude × longitude) and a variable vertical resolution averaging
1.25 km from the boundary layer to near 1 hPa, 2.5 km in the mesosphere,
and 3.5 km in the lower thermosphere, above about 0.01 hPa.
WACCM was used as the atmospheric model to be able to simulate
the physical and chemical consequences of injection and lofting of
BC to great heights in the atmosphere. To represent the evolution of
a massive injection of smoke accurately, we coupled WACCM with
the Community Aerosol and Radiation Model for Atmospheres
(CARMA) (56). CARMA is a sectional aerosol parameterization that
resolves the aerosol size distribution and allows the size distribution
of the aerosols to evolve freely, which is necessary when simulating
large aerosol injections, as in this study. CARMA aerosols are advected by WACCM, are subject to wet and dry deposition, affect the
surface albedo when they are incorporated into snow, and are included in the WACCM radiative transfer calculation.
Soot was treated as a fractal aggregate for both microphysics and
radiative transfer (57), and coagulation of soot particles was considered.
The fractal particles have a monomer size of 30 nm, a fractal dimension varying between 1.5 and 3.0, and a packing coefficient of 1 (57).
The shortwave optical properties of the fractal soot particles are dependent on monomer size, which is fixed at emission, but as observed
(58) are largely independent of particle size, which does increase
due to coagulation caused by the large soot emissions used in our
simulations. The Rapid Radiative Transfer Model for General Circulation Models (RRTMG) (59), a radiation package within CESM, was
used to include the radiative effects of the impact-generated aerosols.
Optical properties for the soot aggregates were calculated using a
mean field approximation (60) assuming a real refractive index of
1.95 and an imaginary refractive index of 0.79.
The burdens of soot aerosol considered here cause large temperature changes in the stratosphere and mesosphere, which required
changes to WACCM to improve the numerical stability of the model
as discussed by Bardeen et al. (48). We reported seven simulations
for this study, a 20-year control simulation, and six experiments of
15-year duration each with varying amounts of soot injection.
Smoke is a complex mixture of BC (or soot) and a variety of
organic compounds. In general, the organic material has a very low
absorptivity at visible wavelengths. However, in addition to BC,
some light-absorbing organic carbon in the form of “brown” carbon
can be emitted by fires. The loss rates and mechanisms for brown
carbon are poorly known, but lifetimes observed in the atmosphere
are on the order of 1 day (61). Thus, although brown carbon would
likely contribute to the short-term properties of smoke aerosol, it is
not clear that it would be a significant long-term component of the
smoke lofted into the stratosphere. Highly absorbing BC may compose
only a few percentage of smoke from forest fires, even for smoke
injected into the stratosphere (43, 62). The remainder is composed
of various forms of organic carbon. Much of the material consumed
in urban fires is not composed of wood, and the wood that is consumed
is dry and lacking much of the organic material in living wood. In
addition, mass fires are much hotter than normal forest fires and
may consume the organics in the fire. Organics are also subsequently
oxidized by reaction with OH and ozone [for example, see (43)].
Recent observations of forest fire smoke in the stratosphere suggest
that the organics are removed by chemical reactions with a lifetime of
around 4 months (43). Because of the uncertainty in the emission
rates and the added complexity in the chemistry of smoke organics,
we did not include brown carbon or organic carbon in our simulations. Emissions of 45 Tg of organic carbon and 5 Tg of BC were
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included in simulations of regional nuclear war by Pausata et al. (33)
who found that the added organics increase the surface cooling but
that the larger particle size reduces the lifetime of the aerosols and,
thus, the duration of the climate effects, from ~20 to ~10 years. Although it
would be desirable to treat the smoke as an internal mixture of BC and
organics, the emission factors for all of the smoke components and
the oxidation pathways for the many organic components are poorly
defined and beyond the current capabilities of our model. The optical depth of organic and/or water-coated soot particles can be about
1.5 times larger than for pure soot particles (63). Thus, our simulations may underestimate the total absorption of the soot particles;
on the other hand, these particles would also be larger, with reduced
lifetimes (33).
CESM version 1.3 is coupled with the ocean component known
as the Parallel Ocean Program (POP) version 2 (64), with ocean biogeochemistry simulated by the BEC model (65), and the land component CLM version 4 (CLM4) with carbon-nitrogen cycle (CLM4CN)
on (66). BEC includes three explicit phytoplankton functional groups
(diatoms, diazotrophs, and picophytoplankton) and one implicit
group (calcifiers) subject to multiple nutrient limitation (N, P, Si,
and Fe) (65). Ocean net primary production is calculated as the sum
of the carbon fixation by the three groups of phytoplankton over the
top 150 m of the water column (67). CLM4CN specifies 15 plant
functional types over vegetated land units and simulates vegetation
changes with a fully prognostic treatment of the terrestrial carbon
and nitrogen cycle, including interactions with biological mechanisms
of plants and soil heterotrophs.
Our previous modeling of a nuclear conflict between India and
Pakistan (13, 14) differs in major alterations in the war scenarios
and significantly in the mass of BC injected, as well as in the treatment
of particle physics and optics. The scenario in table S1, for example,
considers the projected arsenals in 2025, which are about five times
larger than those of 2007 assumed in (13, 14). We also treated a range
of possible yields from 15 to 100 kt, whereas before, only 15-kt
yields were used. Previously, smoke particles were assumed to be
spherical with a fixed size of 50 nm; here, we allowed the size to vary,
as particles coagulate to larger sizes and sediment with size-dependent
fall velocities. We also allowed the particles to be fractal in structure
with 30-nm monomers, as is observed in sooty smoke plumes. We,
moreover, modified particle refractive indices to reflect currently
accepted values for BC.
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